How safe is Tor for logging into http (nont https) web sites

[Anonymous Sender]

Krazee Brenda wrote:

> On Fri, 26 Oct 2007 03:35:03 -0500, VanguardLH wrote:
>
> >> Is my password still secure when logging into an http account with
> >> Tor/Privoxy running?
> >
> > Since you are now using a proxy, and because the proxy can pretend to
> > be the target site, and because the proxy could establish the SSL
> > connect with you and then an SSL connect to the target site (so both
> > use SSL but not directly to each other), now you have to trust the
> > proxy doesn't intercept your SSL request and won't pretend to be the
> > target site. Do you really trust Tor with you bank login? Do you
> > know what Tor proxy you are using and who operates it? Anything
> > between you and the target site can be an interceptor SSL proxy but
> > there's less chance it will be your ISP or the backbone that they use.
> > With Tor, well, who knows who is running each of its peer hosts. The
> > Tor servers are ran by volunteers, not by your ISP or your bank. As I
> > recall, a bluecoat proxy can do SSL interception.
> >
> > http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post...passwords.html
> >
> > It suggests using encryption (SSL); however, that still doesn't
> > prevent the Tor server user from intercepting. You get anonymity, not
> > necessarily security, with P2P networks. However, even if there were
> > no such interception, using SSL means the target knows the source.
> > With P2P, there are more unknown hosts you pass through, more chances
> > for man-in-the-middle attacks.

By their very nature P2P networks aren't susceptible to MITM attacks.
There's no need of course because there's nothing to learn that's not
public knowledge, but more to the point at hand nothing is relayed past
that second "P". That's why they're called "points".

> Tel that to Mr. Anonymous, the Knower Of All Things

There's a lot of ignorance and outright FUD regarding security being
perpetrated by people who know very little about it. Those of us who
actually have studied the subject in depth simply like to set the
record straight.

If that upsets you it speaks more to your particular level of education
than mental state than anything else.

Is it safe to trust your bank account to a Tor node operator? Of course
not. That's just a blatantly silly question. You shouldn't trust anyone
with that sort of information. Using Tor to access your bank account is
irrelevant in most applications anyway. Your bank knows who you are
already by your login.

Still, there are conceivable situations where Tor and banks together
can be useful. The "Chinese dissident" scenario, where an oppressive
regime even knowing you're managing funds outside their control might
cause you much grief. For that application Tor is ideal. It masks both
what you're doing and where you're doing it at from anyone on your end
of the Tor network. And your identity from observers on the other end.
To secure the actual information you're transferring you need to encrypt
the connection end to end, but that's a hard fact regardless of whether
Tor is in the mix or not.

Tor and SSL are to completely different tools for two completely
different jobs. Sometimes they compliment each other, sometimes they're
irrlevant to each other, and yes, sometimes they can even oppose each
other. It's up to the user to learn the mostly simple principals that
allow them to recognize which tool is best suited to which job, and
avoid the pitfalls of using the wrong tool.

[VanguardLH]

"Aaron" <aaronnewsgroup@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:Xns99D5DA9491B1Faaronnewsgroup@85.214.62.108. ..
> "VanguardLH" <VanguardLH@mail.invalid> wrote in
> news:KMOdnVZ0LvcpO7zanZ2dnUVZ_vCknZ2d@comcast.com:
>
>> "Joan Battaglia" wrote in message
>> news:4weUi.17176$JD.3743@newssvr21.news.prodigy.ne t...
>
>>> Is my password still secure when logging into an http account with
>>> Tor/Privoxy running?
>>
>>
>> Since you are now using a proxy, and because the proxy can pretend
>> to
>> be the target site, and because the proxy could establish the SSL
>> connect with you and then an SSL connect to the target site (so
>> both
>> use SSL but not directly to each other), now you have to trust the
>> proxy doesn't intercept your SSL request and won't pretend to be
>> the
>> target site.
>
> Eh. That doesn't work. If it "pretends to be the target site", the
> certificate won't match up. Right?
>


The interceptor gives you THEIR certificate, not the one at the target
site that you meant to hit. Anyone can be a CA for their own certs.
Companies do it all the time because they don't want to keep paying
outside parties for them; i.e., they operate their own internal or
private CA which validates their own certs (they have their own
certificate server). They use self-signed certs. Even the root CAs
are self-signed but then they are supposed to be the public trusted
CAs. So you intend to go to domainA.com but go through a proxy ran by
an unknown. They give you a cert that says it is for domainA. Who is
the CA (certificate authority) for the cert? It's the CA specified in
the cert. The CA is [supposed to be] a trusted 3rd party. So you get
a cert from them that says they are the CA so they validate their own
cert; i.e., they are their own certifier for the cert they gave you.
Since the CA is the only one that can validate a cert, you or your
apps don't head off to some other CA because they weren't the one that
issued the cert. The design of SSL and the PKI places the
responsibility on the end user to verify the correctness of their set
of trusted certificates. How many users run certmgr.msc or otherwise
look at the properties of the cert they got proffered to see the
hierarchy of CAs specified by the cert? Would it matter if they saw
the hierarchy for a self-signed cert where the issuer used some other
name as the CA? How many users get a cert warning from their browser
but ignore it (because the site used a cert for one of their other
domains or it expired, so users get used to ignoring those alerts).

SSL interception proxy. They exist. Some are used to interrogate the
content of your traffic to determine if it is appropriate for the
company. Well, they can't look at the content unless they did the
man-in-the-middle interception. They don't bother to decrypt your
traffic. They just intercept it by making you think they were the
target you intended to hit. Can SSL be subverted by clever criminals?
"If you're talking about a scenario where they spoof a Web site, the
answer is yes," said Tim Callan, Group Product Marketing Manager for
VeriSign.

As pointed out, any node in your path to the SSL target site could do
the interception. I'm saying that with Tor that you are traversing
nodes operated by unknown owners and probably across multiple
countries, several of which have no reciprocity laws regarding fraud.
You might not know who owns all the nodes in a normal route to your
site but it is a good bet that they can be discovered versus the
anonymity of Tor operators. With spoof sites using SSL, and since no
one has to register to authenticate their identify to be a Tor
operator, why wouldn't these same defrauding users also operate a Tor
point?

Don't trust your bank accounts, online buying, PayPal, login
passwords, or any other privacy data over Tor. What you send to the
target site is obviously available to a Tor operator, too.

[Anonymous]

Krazee Brenda wrote:

> On Fri, 26 Oct 2007 10:00:17 +0000 (UTC), Anonymous Sender wrote:
>
> > Krazee Brenda wrote:
> >
> >> On Fri, 26 Oct 2007 05:00:48 GMT, Joan Battaglia wrote:
> >>
> >>> Thanks to you all, I was able to install Tor/Vidalia/Privoxy freeware for
> >>> anonymous web browsing.
> >>>
> >>> When I log into an https email web page, I assume my password is
> >> protected
> >>> from snoopers on the Tor network itself. That is, I assume the https
> >>> encryption prevents a rogue Tor server itself from seeing my password.
> >>
> >> Nopeware.
> >
> > You're wrong about that. As long as you haven't borked up your security
> > settings and told your browser to not warn you about bad/changed SSL
> > certificates you're fine. Tor is no different than any other encrypted
> > connection. SSL will encrypt your passwords and such end to end unless
> > you break it somehow. And it IS up to you to pay attention, whether or
> > not you're using Tor.
>
> As long as you haven't tried to cross an Interstate at rush hour, you'll
> be safe too.

A pretty good analogy. I'll put it into proper perspective for you...

Crossing the freeway at rush hour demands willful action and
abandonment of common sense. There's prescribed crossing points called
traffic lights, and in most jurisdictions not using them is actually
punishable by a fine.

Likewise default browser settings, which all warn you about forged and
broken SSL certificates. You have to purposefully do something like
click past several dialogs warning you about your bad decisions, adopt a
policy of not paying any attention to the warnings, or "wander
aimlessly out into the busy street", if you wish. :-)

IOW, in both scenarios the real danger is the person doing something
wantonly stupid. That's why foot traffic is prohibited on major
thruways in fact... to protect stupid people from themselves. I don't
know if that philosophy scales to browser settings though. ;-)

[Anonymous Sender]

VanguardLH wrote:

> "Aaron" <aaronnewsgroup@gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:Xns99D5DA9491B1Faaronnewsgroup@85.214.62.108. ..
> > "VanguardLH" <VanguardLH@mail.invalid> wrote in
> > news:KMOdnVZ0LvcpO7zanZ2dnUVZ_vCknZ2d@comcast.com:
> >
> >> "Joan Battaglia" wrote in message
> >> news:4weUi.17176$JD.3743@newssvr21.news.prodigy.ne t...
> >
> >>> Is my password still secure when logging into an http account with
> >>> Tor/Privoxy running?
> >>
> >>
> >> Since you are now using a proxy, and because the proxy can pretend
> >> to
> >> be the target site, and because the proxy could establish the SSL
> >> connect with you and then an SSL connect to the target site (so
> >> both
> >> use SSL but not directly to each other), now you have to trust the
> >> proxy doesn't intercept your SSL request and won't pretend to be
> >> the
> >> target site.
> >
> > Eh. That doesn't work. If it "pretends to be the target site", the
> > certificate won't match up. Right?
> >
>
>
> The interceptor gives you THEIR certificate,

<snip>

That's the whole point. That's WHY the certs don't match up and WHY Tor
nodes (or anyone else) trying to launch MITM attacks fail. Signatures
and CA's are meaningless at that point. Unless you cripple your own
software you get big honking errors.

Why do you think SSL exists in the first place for God's sake?

[Anonymous Sender]

VanguardLH wrote:

> "Aaron" <aaronnewsgroup@gmail.com> wrote in message
> news:Xns99D5DA9491B1Faaronnewsgroup@85.214.62.108. ..
> > "VanguardLH" <VanguardLH@mail.invalid> wrote in
> > news:KMOdnVZ0LvcpO7zanZ2dnUVZ_vCknZ2d@comcast.com:
> >
> >> "Joan Battaglia" wrote in message
> >> news:4weUi.17176$JD.3743@newssvr21.news.prodigy.ne t...
> >
> >>> Is my password still secure when logging into an http account with
> >>> Tor/Privoxy running?
> >>
> >>
> >> Since you are now using a proxy, and because the proxy can pretend
> >> to
> >> be the target site, and because the proxy could establish the SSL
> >> connect with you and then an SSL connect to the target site (so
> >> both
> >> use SSL but not directly to each other), now you have to trust the
> >> proxy doesn't intercept your SSL request and won't pretend to be
> >> the
> >> target site.
> >
> > Eh. That doesn't work. If it "pretends to be the target site", the
> > certificate won't match up. Right?
> >
>
>
> The interceptor gives you THEIR certificate, not the one at the target
> site that you meant to hit. Anyone can be a CA for their own certs.

You're missing the point completely, and/or don't know much about
SSL.Your entire treatise is built on several false assumptions.

Yes, sites can sign their own certificates. They can eve use unsigned
certificates. What you're apparently unaware of is the fact that if a
certificate is not signed by a previously trusted authority it causes
browsers to complain. Some even refuse to allow you to install unsigned
certificates so they complain repeatedly.

Browsers also pitch a fit if a certificate changes. Depending on the
browser and version they make accepting new certificates a real hassle
in fact. So even if an evil Tor node were to manage to buy a
certificate in the name of your bank with a CA endorsement (which would
require circumventing the verification process), you'd know about it
instantly.

I suggest that you do some actual research on SSL itself instead of
reading gloom and doom reports of how Tor nodes can break SSL. It's not
nearly as easy as you seem to believe it is.

> Companies do it all the time because they don't want to keep paying
> outside parties for them; i.e., they operate their own internal or
> private CA which validates their own certs (they have their own
> certificate server). They use self-signed certs. Even the root CAs
> are self-signed but then they are supposed to be the public trusted
> CAs. So you intend to go to domainA.com but go through a proxy ran by
> an unknown. They give you a cert that says it is for domainA. Who is

SSL also has a built in mechanism for detecting certificates that don't
match the domain you're visiting. Browsers issue "doesn't match"
warnings, and typically state one possible cause of the error being
someone trying to "spoof" some other site.

> the CA (certificate authority) for the cert? It's the CA specified in
> the cert. The CA is [supposed to be] a trusted 3rd party. So you get
> a cert from them that says they are the CA so they validate their own
> cert; i.e., they are their own certifier for the cert they gave you.
> Since the CA is the only one that can validate a cert, you or your
> apps don't head off to some other CA because they weren't the one that
> issued the cert. The design of SSL and the PKI places the
> responsibility on the end user to verify the correctness of their set
> of trusted certificates. How many users run certmgr.msc or otherwise
> look at the properties of the cert they got proffered to see the
> hierarchy of CAs specified by the cert? Would it matter if they saw

Unless you specifically turn it off, ALL users do this. That's what the
security settings are there for. As long as you don't mess with things
you don't understand or willfully put yourself in an insecure position,
none of the attacks you claim to exist can work. Period. SSL is just
"better than that" after years and years of development.

> the hierarchy for a self-signed cert where the issuer used some other
> name as the CA? How many users get a cert warning from their browser
> but ignore it (because the site used a cert for one of their other
> domains or it expired, so users get used to ignoring those alerts).
>
> SSL interception proxy. They exist. Some are used to interrogate the
> content of your traffic to determine if it is appropriate for the
> company. Well, they can't look at the content unless they did the
> man-in-the-middle interception. They don't bother to decrypt your
> traffic. They just intercept it by making you think they were the
> target you intended to hit. Can SSL be subverted by clever criminals?

Complete nonsense. Without decrypting traffic there's no way in hell
they can present a user with meaningful content. No way to make a user
believe anything at all.

> "If you're talking about a scenario where they spoof a Web site, the
> answer is yes," said Tim Callan, Group Product Marketing Manager for
> VeriSign.

He also said this...

"If every Internet user in the world had a browser that recognized the
difference between High Assurance SSL Certificates and traditional ones
and if every legitimate site used a High Assurance certificate, then
phishing as we know it today would essentially be eliminated."

This recognizes the fact that SSL is impervious to the sort of things
you're describing when used properly. As people have been saying.

> As pointed out, any node in your path to the SSL target site could do
> the interception. I'm saying that with Tor that you are traversing
> nodes operated by unknown owners and probably across multiple
> countries, several of which have no reciprocity laws regarding fraud.

Irrelevant. For one, you have no way of knowing whether or not your
"normal" connection traverses those same geographic borders. The nature
of the net means connections are often bounced globally.

> You might not know who owns all the nodes in a normal route to your
> site but it is a good bet that they can be discovered versus the
> anonymity of Tor operators. With spoof sites using SSL, and since no

Tor operators are NOT anonymous. What ever gave you the impression that
they are? Truth is, they're far more visible than a hop in the routing
of a "normal" connection, and not nearly as transient.

> one has to register to authenticate their identify to be a Tor
> operator, why wouldn't these same defrauding users also operate a Tor
> point?
>
> Don't trust your bank accounts, online buying, PayPal, login
> passwords, or any other privacy data over Tor. What you send to the
> target site is obviously available to a Tor operator, too.
>

Baloney. There's perfectly good reasons for conducting sensitive
business through Tor, in fact certain scenarios within that context are
the reasons Tor exists in teh first place. And there's secure ways of
doing just that. All you need to do is learn some basics, and pay
attention to any warnigns or errors you get.

[Ari]

On Fri, 26 Oct 2007 21:01:04 +0000 (UTC), Anonymous Sender wrote:

> Is it safe to trust your bank account to a Tor node operator? Of course
> not. That's just a blatantly silly question. You shouldn't trust anyone
> with that sort of information. Using Tor to access your bank account is
> irrelevant in most applications anyway. Your bank knows who you are
> already by your login.

No one knows who you are by any login. All anyone knows is that someone, or
thing, has logged in. Period.

What an oxymoronic thing for you to say. Mr. Anonymous. lol

[Ari]

On Fri, 26 Oct 2007 21:01:04 +0000 (UTC), Anonymous Sender wrote:

> > Tel that to Mr. Anonymous, the Knower Of All Things
>
> There's a lot of ignorance and outright FUD regarding security being
> perpetrated by people who know very little about it. Those of us who
> actually have studied the subject in depth simply like to set the
> record straight.
>
> If that upsets you it speaks more to your particular level of education
> than mental state than anything else.

I don't get upset when Know-It-Alls know less than much. Humored? Now
that's another discussion.

So here how this works out. I actually deal on a daily basis with those
things you expound to have studied. Let's see here. Which is better? A med
student with an over-inflated value of his bookworms or the medical doctor
who actually sees patients?

I don't know. Help?

[Anonymous]

Ari wrote:

> On Fri, 26 Oct 2007 21:01:04 +0000 (UTC), Anonymous Sender wrote:
>
> > > Tel that to Mr. Anonymous, the Knower Of All Things
> >
> > There's a lot of ignorance and outright FUD regarding security being
> > perpetrated by people who know very little about it. Those of us who
> > actually have studied the subject in depth simply like to set the
> > record straight.
> >
> > If that upsets you it speaks more to your particular level of education
> > than mental state than anything else.
>
> I don't get upset when Know-It-Alls know less than much. Humored? Now
> that's another discussion.
>
> So here how this works out. I actually deal on a daily basis with those

You don't deal with squat. You're a common Usenet troll who has
demonstrated time and time again that you know absolutely nothing at
all about computer security, encryption, or networking. Your mistakes
and erroneous assertions are those of a clueless rube, and your
fantasies about being some sort of "professional" are bald faced lies.

> things you expound to have studied. Let's see here. Which is better? A med
> student with an over-inflated value of his bookworms or the medical doctor
> who actually sees patients?
>
> I don't know. Help?

You definitely need some if you believe you're functioning at some
sort of doctoral level here.

[Anonymous]

Ari wrote:

> On Fri, 26 Oct 2007 21:01:04 +0000 (UTC), Anonymous Sender wrote:
>
> > Is it safe to trust your bank account to a Tor node operator? Of course
> > not. That's just a blatantly silly question. You shouldn't trust anyone
> > with that sort of information. Using Tor to access your bank account is
> > irrelevant in most applications anyway. Your bank knows who you are
> > already by your login.
>
> No one knows who you are by any login. All anyone knows is that someone, or
> thing, has logged in. Period.

ROTFL!

Sure, if an account is logged into it could always be an evil alien
toaster or something.

You're an idiot.

>
> What an oxymoronic thing for you to say. Mr. Anonymous. lol

[Joan Battaglia]

On Fri, 26 Oct 2007 21:07:50 -0500, VanguardLH wrote:

> Don't trust your bank accounts, online buying, PayPal, login
> passwords, or any other privacy data over Tor. What you send to the
> target site is obviously available to a Tor operator, too.

I'm not sure I understand the bottom line.
Are you saying BOTH http and https are compromised when one uses a Tor?

In other words, does Tor give us anonymity but not privacy?
Or, can we use https for the privacy and http for the anonymity?

Sorry I'm confused.